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The long and lonely road from
a regulated air transport in-
dustry to multilateral libera-
lisation: Bilateralism versus
WTO principles
by Pablo Mendes de Leon*
Air transport is the only sector which is
not regulated under the general Agree-
ment on Trade in Services (GATS), of
the World Trade organisation (WTO).
This short essay discusses the obstacles
which the air transport industry faces
when it will move from the current re-
strictive framework to a free regime, as
shaped by the WTO/GATS. 
Attention will be paid to liberalisation
efforts undertaken so far, especially
through Open Skies agreements, and
the efforts undertaken by the European
Community. I will examine the question,
why it takes so long to take the next
step, that is, taking the provision of air
transport services under the GATS.
1. The current regime of the GATS
with special reference to air trans-
port
The GATS is based upon the so called
L’italia aderisce al protocollo
del 2003 alla convenzione in-
ternazionale iopc fund del 1992
di Enrico-Maria Pujia*
Con la legge n. 130 del 12 luglio
2005, pubblicata sulla G.U. del 13 lu-
glio 2005, è stata ratificata l’adesione
dell’Italia al Protocollo del 2003 alla
Convenzione internazionale IOPC
Fund del 1992, relativo all’istituzione
di un Fondo complementare interna-
zionale per il risarcimento dei danni
causati dall’inquinamento da idrocar-
buri, fatto a Londra il 16 maggio
2003. 
Questa norma conferisce piena ed in-
tera esecuzione al predetto Protocollo
a decorrere dalla data della sua entra-
ta in vigore, in conformità a quanto
disposto dall’articolo 21, paragrafo 2,
del Protocollo stesso.
Adempimenti più importanti di detto
protocollo, come per la Convenzione
originaria, sono quelli che coinvolgo-
no direttamente i destinatari di idro-
carburi e quindi il Ministero delle Atti-
vità Produttive che ai sensi degli arti-
coli 12, e 13, del Protocollo, e sulla
base degli articoli 9 e 10 del decreto
del Presidente della Repubblica 27
maggio 1978, n. 504, è tenuto a tra-
smette le informazioni previste dall’ar-
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La Navigazione satellitare: Galileo e i Programmi applicativi della
Agenzia Spaziale Italiana
di Mario Caporale*
Sommario - La Navigazione satellitare già permea con le sue notevoli po-
tenzialità molteplici attività della vita umana. Le potenzialità applicative
del Programma Galileo e del suo precursore, il Programma EGNOS, ven-
gono sottolineate dai programmi applicativi della Agenzia Spaziale Ita-
liana, volti a favorire l’innovazione tecnologica di applicazioni e servizi,
preparando la via all’uso del sistema Galileo.
Indici - Navigazione Satellitare, GPS, Galileo, EGNOS, GLONASS, Integrità,
Garanzia del servizio.
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Most Favoured National – henceforth:
MFN - principle which is formulated
as follows:
“With respect to any measure cove-
red by this Agreement, each Member
shall accord immediately and uncon-
ditionally to services and service sup-
pliers of any other member state
treatment no less favourable than it
accords to like services and service
suppliers of any other country.”1
In other words, rights granted to one
trading partner are automatically
granted to all trading partners subscri-
bing the GATS, unless they have ma-
de a reservation with respect to the
application of this principle when si-
gning the agreement. However, there
are several methods to mitigate this
so called “bonus effect” of the MFN
principle, one of which is to make the
grant of a concession on a MFN basis
dependant from reciprocal conces-
sions (as to which see further below).
Another basic principle of WTO/GATS
is the provision of national treatment.
As opposed to MFN, which places all
foreign contracting states at the same
level, national treatment grants the
same advantages to foreign operators
as to domestic operators. “National
Treatment” provides an even higher
level of market access. Here again,
contracting states may make reserva-
tions when signing the agreement. 
The EC Treaty introduces national
treatment for all operators having an
establishment in the European Com-
munity. I will briefly allude to national
treatment in the context of air trans-
port (see below).
Interestingly, the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT of 1947)
contains one provision which applies
to the provision of air services. Under
the heading of Freedom of transit, the
agreement provides that the said prin-
ciple (of freedom of transit) shall “not
apply to the operation of aircraft in
transit, but shall apply to air transit of
goods (including baggage).” Hence,
this provision may have implications
for the operation of all-cargo aircraft.
However, it has hardly or never been
invoked. As far as I know, its effect
has not been discussed in air trans-
port circles. 
The GATS Annex on air transport ser-
vices excludes the provision of air
transport services from the scope of
the GATS regime. Such services per-
tain to the operation of traffic rights
and services directly related with the
operation of such rights, including but
not limited to transit rights and
ground handling. 
Via a rather complication legal con-
struction and under somewhat crypti-
cally formulated definitions, the follo-
wing so called ancillary services may
be made subject to the provisions of
the GATS. They are:
(a) aircraft repair and maintenance
services,2 accounting for approxi-
mately 10 per cent of an airline’s
operating costs, and usually car-
ried out by airlines or subsidiaries
set up for that purpose;
(b) the selling and marketing of air
transport services,3 which includes
such activities as ticket sales and
promotional activities but excludes
activities performed through CRS;
(c) computerised reservation system
(CRS) services, which are defined
as “services provided by a compu-
terised system that contains infor-
mation about carriers’ schedule,
availability, fares and fare rules, for
which reservations can be made or
tickets may be issued.”
In total, 40 countries made commit-
ments in at least one of the three air
transport services mentioned above
(33 for maintenance, 26 for selling
and distribution, and 23 for CRS).
Twenty eight countries took MFN
exemptions with respected to at least
one of the three activities, including
the EU on behalf of its Member sta-
tes.4 France even tried to remove CRS
from the GATS Annex. The most suc-
cessful steps – in terms of liberalisa-
tion through MFN – have been taken
in the field of aircraft maintenance
and repair, be it that most countries
require that foreign service suppliers
hire local personnel.
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1 See Article II(1) of the GATS, which can
be found at the web site of the WTO:
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/
legal_e.htm - last visited on 12 September
2005.
2 Meaning “... such activities when under-
taken on an aircraft or a part thereof while
it is withdrawn from service and do not in-
clude so-called line maintenance.”
3 Defined as “… opportunities for the air
carrier concerned to sell and market freely
its air transport services including all
aspects of marketing such as market re-
search, advertising and distribution. These
activities do not include pricing of air trans-
port services or the applicable conditions.”
4 See UNCTAD Secretariat, Air Transport
Services: the positive agenda for develo-
ping countries, TD/B/COM.1/EM.9/2.
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All in all, it is not easy to determine
the degree of liberalisation of the
above ancillary air services. The sub-
ject matter is as complicated as incon-
veniently arranged. In order to assess
whether or not commitments have
been made, one has to examine the
concessions, laid down in schemes,
and the reservations thereto.
In 2000, WTO launched a new round
of trade negotiations, including GATS
2000. A number of papers made by
the US Department of Transportation
(DoT), the Association of European
Airlines (AEA) and academics clarify
positions.5 The US Dot and AEA do
not appear to favour a fundamental
change of the current bilateral system
through GATS, and the application of
MFN to air transport services. Instead,
AEA promotes liberalisation of a num-
ber of air services, namely, transit
rights, wet leasing of aircraft, ground
handling, airport and air navigation
charges and air cargo services,
through inclusion thereof in the GATS
2000 agenda. DoT takes a very reser-
ved stance towards the inclusion of
aviation issues in GATS. The US posi-
tion holds that such inclusion raises
myriad problems and questions. More
importantly perhaps, (unconditional)
MFN would allow non-US operators
access to the valuable US aviation
market.
Curiously enough, the Commission
has not an outspoken standpoint on
the above question. This is notable as
the EC treaty promotes “an open
market with free competition.”6 Con-
sequently, it could be argued, that the
Commission, as the guardian of the
treaty principles, should lead the way
towards the achievement of this ob-
jective. 
However, the Commission has ano-
ther agenda for liberalising air servi-
ces. This agenda is briefly explained in
section 3 of this short essay.
Five years later, we must conclude
that there are no results. As to air
transport, GATS has the same covera-
ge as before 2000. The next section
will examine how MFN relates to the
bilateral system, and explain why
GATS 2000 did not make progress in
the area of air transport. 
2. THE INCOMPATIBILITY BETWEEN MFN
AND RECIPROCITY
Bilateral air services agreements regu-
late trade in air services between pairs
of countries. There are some 3500 of
such agreements world wide, creating
markets – that is, essentially the ope-
ration of routes – between the coun-
tries party to the agreement. In excep-
tional cases, such as the European
Community,7 markets are established
on a regional, multilateral basis. 
Concessions with respect to market
access are negotiated bilaterally, on a
quid pro quo basis; in other words,
pursuant to reciprocity. In short, bila-
teral agreements regulate trade whe-
reas GATS deregulates trade.
This systems contrasts sharply with
the world trade system set up by the
WTO, especially so if the “unconditio-
nal”8 MFN is applied in multilateral
trade deals. 
If applied to the air transport sector,
application of the “unconditional”
MFN would mean that traffic rights
granted to one party to the – multila-
teral – agreement, as then covered by
the GATS Annex on air transport ser-
vices – would imply that all parties to
the agreement would enjoy the same
benefits or rights. 
To put it more concretely, if the EC
Member States would have to accord
the privileges they exchanged under
the Third Aviation package of 1992 to
non-EC operators designated by or
belonging to states subscribing to
MFN in the air transport sector, such
non-Community air carriers would be
entitled to operated fifth, sixth and
seventh Freedom rights between
points in the Community – on the sa-
me footing as Community air carriers. 
This is one of the fears of the US DoT
with respect to the GATS approach:
under certain post-1992 Open Skies
agreements, the US granted seventh
Freedom cargo rights to cargo carriers
designated by its bilateral – “Open
Skies” – partners. If the US – under an
MFN principle – would be required to
accord the seventh Freedom privilege
to all its trading, or even “Open
Skies” partners, a restrictive foreign
state would not be stimulated to en-
hance market access. 
It would enjoy a free rider treatment,
while being able to retain its protec-
tionist policy. 
If “national treatment” were to be
applied to air transport, foreign sup-
pliers of air services – air carriers –
Continua ...
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5 Office of International Aviation of the US
Department of Transportation, Aviation Is-
sues in GATS 2000 and Other Fora, July
1999; AEA, Position Paper on GATS 2000
and air transport, Christopher Findly, Air
Transport, paper prepared for East Asia
Conference, Options for the WTO 2000
Negotiations, PECC/TPF and World Bank,
Manila, July 19-20, 1999; the Economic
Commission of ICAO, Report of the 33rd
Session of the Assembly, Montreal, 25
September – 5 October 2001 Doc 9798,
A33-EC, and the Address made the OECD
Secretary general Donald J. Johnston, Op-
tions for Liberalisation in International Air
Transportation, IATA World Transport Sum-
mit “Globalisation the Way Forward”, Ma-
drid 27-29 May 2001, and the UK Depart-
ment of Trade and Industry, Liberalising
trade in services, A consultative document
on the “GATS 2000” negotiations in the
World Trade Organization and forthcoming
bilateral negotiations (not dated).
6 See Article 4(2).
7 Through the application of Regulations
2407/92 on licensing of Community air car-
riers, Regulation 2408/92 on market ac-
cess and 2409/92 on fares and rates for air
services (see OJ L 240 (1992)).
8 The term “unconditional” meaning that
concessions are granted to all parties to
the agreement without reservations or con-
ditions attached to such grant.
might claim the operation of domestic
routes in another state – just like do-
mestic carriers. Most national legisla-
tions forbid this. 
The Chicago Convention leaves the
door open to the exchange of cabota-
ge rights, under a provision which by
some commentators has been explai-
ned as an MFN clause.9
Hence, both from a legal and from an
air policy perspective it is not easy if
not a huge challenge to harmonise
the current bilateral system prevailing
in international civil aviation with mul-
tilateral trade principles of the GATS.
MFN and even more so national treat-
ment are a “no go” for the current
state of affairs in the air transport sec-
tor. 
A few lonely voices world wide, such
as Singapore, and academics10 pro-
mote this fundamentally innovative
approach towards the operation of air
services internationally. 
In the meantime, a more cautious,
step-by-step policy appears to be mo-
re realistic.
3. INTERMEDIATE OR ALTERNATIVE TRACKS
ON THE WAY TO LIBERALISATION OF AIR
SERVICES
Absent a global trade regime freeing
air transport from its a priori restric-
tions, the following steps may produ-
ce relaxation of such restrictions.
3.1 Moving away from bilateral re-
strictions on the operation of the in-
ternational services
This is the US policy as conducted un-
der Open Skies Agreements. In 2005,
more than 60 of such agreements ha-
ve been concluded world wide. They
provide for:
– the operation of the first Six Free-
doms of the Air, and, in some cases,
the Seventh Freedom of the Air for
all cargo operations (as to which see
above);
– Multiple designation on each side;
– Free pricing, which is subject to a
posteriori control by competition
authorities (rather than a priori go-
vernmental approval);
– The offer of free capacity in the pro-
vision of the agreed international air
services, again without clauses desi-
gned to limit capacity operated by
the designated air carriers;
– The freedom to code share and
franchise on the agreed internatio-
nal routes;
– Liberal provisions with respect to
the provision of ground handling
services.11
However, nationality conditions based
on ownership and control continue to
limit market access to the operators
Continua ...
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of the two parties to the bilateral
agreement. 
Limited market access between fo-
reign points is granted by virtue of the
mentioned Seventh Freedom rights.
Eighth and ninth Freedom rights, also
referred to as cabotage and briefly
discussed above, are not part of the
US inspired Open Skies Agreements.
Other Open Skies agreements, for in-
stance, the one concluded between
Uruguay and Chilli in 2003, provide
for the grant of eight Freedom rights
(in this case by Chilli to carriers desi-
gnated by Uruguay).
3.2 Application of competition regime
to international air services
WTO knows a competition regime,
prohibiting export subsidies.12
This objective can be assured by and a
dispute resolution system,13 under
which so called ‘panels’ may be esta-
blished of consultations and other
means of diplomatic and political in-
struments, such as conciliation and
mediation fail. 
On 31 May 2005, the Washington
Post reported that the U.S. had issued
a statement calling for the WTO to
appoint as panel of judges to examine
the claim made by the U.S. govern-
ment that European governments we-
re illegally subsidising Airbus in-
dustry.14 The EU states to have a co-
unter claim against the US on the sa-
me grounds – that is, illegal export
9 The provision in question is Article 7(2) of
the Chicago Convention which reads:
“Each contracting State undertakes not to
enter into any arrangements which specifi-
cally grant any such privilege on an exclu-
sive basis to any other State or an airline
of any other State, and not to obtain any
such exclusive privilege from any other
State.” In the 1960s, the Scandinavian co-
untries having established SAS feared that
they might be forced to grant cabotage
rights to all states party to the Chicago
Convention u8nder the above provision
(Article 7(2)), as they allowed SAS to fly
domestic routes in any Scandinavian co-
untry. Cf. ICAO Doc. C-WP/4406 of 26
March, 26 May and 26 September 1966,
and the Minutes of the 7th Plenary Meeting
of the Sixteenth Session of the ICAO As-
sembly, Doc. 8775 A16-Min.P/1-9.
10 See H.A. Wassenbergh, International Air
Transport as a Trade in Services, Lloyd’s
of London Press, Speaker’s Papers of the
International Civil Aviation Conference # 4,
New York City, 10-11 June 1982, at 92-
106, and, by the same author: The Appli-
cation of International Trade Principles to
Air Transport, XII(2) Air Law 84-93 (1987). 
11 See Annex 1 to this article.
12 See Article 3 of the Uruguay Round Sub-
sidies Agreement, which can be found at
the web site of the WTO:
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/
legal_e.htm - last visited on 12 September
2005.
13 See Article 6 of Annex 2 to the WTO
Agreement, see the web site of the WTO:
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/
legal_e.htm - last visited on 12 September
2005.
14 See, Paul Blustein, Aircraft subsidy batt-
le is Going Back to WTO, Washington Post
of 31 May 2005.
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subsidies regarding Boeing.15 Ob-
viously, the dispute between the two
is not based upon the GATS or infrin-
gements thereof, but on the EC-US
Agreement on Trade in Large Aircraft
of 1992,16 dealing with the limitation
of direct and indirect government aid.
The application of a competition regi-
me to international air services may
be more complicated than moving
away from the above restrictions on
the operation of international air ser-
vices, as such application introduces a
new element into the regulatory fra-
mework of air transport services.
Competition regimes can be applied
in a bilateral, regional and multilateral
context, if there is agreement bet-
ween the parties to a bilateral, regio-
nal, plurilateral or multilateral agree-
ment which competition regime ap-
plies, absent a global competition re-
gime – as the WTO does not apply to
this sector. 
To apply competition regimes to the
operation of international air services
means leaving a priori economic regu-
lation in terms of pricing, capacity and
other market restrictions behind us.
Far from all states are in favour of
such a drastic move as it could jeopar-
dise the position of “their” national
airlines.
If Open Skies agreements form the US
initiative for greater liberalisation, the
application of a competition regime
could be the European contribution
thereto. 
This appears to be especially indicated
since the coming into force of Regula-
tion 1/2003 which came into force on
1 May 2003. Under the new regula-
tion:
(1) air transport lost its “special sta-
tus” of exemptions under the pre-
vious regimes;
(2) all air services, including those
from and to third states, fall under
its scope;
(3) airlines do not notify their agree-
ments to the Commission anymore
for review and clearance but they
have to justify an interline agree-
ment on consumer benefits
grounds in a “self assessment” test.
The big question is which competition
regime will apply to air services bet-
ween two different jurisdictions –
which is not uncommon in the air
transport sector. 
So far, the air transport sector – as op-
posed to the manufacturing sector, as
to which see the reference to the
Boeing/Airbus dispute above – has not
suffered from complicated procee-
dings, leaving aside the Skytrain quar-
rel in the 1980s.17
The US government appears to take
the position that policy considerations
– translated into the willingness of the
other party to engage into an Open
Skies agreement – prevail over compe-
tition concerns. 
The grant of anti-trust immunity to
Transatlantic alliances is a testimony of
this policy. The Skyteam alliance, re-
questing antitrust immunity, inert alia,
because of the accession of Air Fran-
ce/KLM to this alliance, may prove to
be a test case for the continuity of this
balance between external relations
and competition policy made by the
US government.
The European side has not yet acted.
There is a regime, laid down in Regu-
lation 1/2003, but when and how it
will be applied to the operation of in-
ternational air services is as yet uncer-
tain. A problem may be formed by bi-
lateral clauses which may not be ma-
de subject to this regime as states,
party to the bilateral agreements, are
not “undertakings” under the com-
pletion articles of the EC Treaty. 
In any case, if competition authorities
wish to apply competition law to po-
tentially anti-competitive practices
such as price fixing, capacity restric-
tions and dumping, they must agree
which regime applies. The EC-US
Agreement on Cooperation in the
Field of Competition, providing for
“positive comity” may thereby serve
as an example.18
3.3 Introduction of the Freedom to
establishment
This is not an easy way either to
achieve a liberalised environment for
air transport – perhaps even less so
than the previous one as the air trans-
port sector is not familiar with Free-
dom of establishment principles. Ho-
wever, the European Court of Justice,
in its decision of 5 November 2002,19
found that this principle should be ap-
Continua ...
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15 See also Edward Alden, EU Retaliates
Against US over Airline Subsidies, Finan-
cial Times of 31 May 2005.
16 See again, http://www.wto.org/engli-
sh/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm - last visi-
ted on 12 September 2005.
17 As referred to in the Conference organi-
sed by the Dean Rusk Center of the Uni-
versity of Georgia Law Center in the pro-
ceedings of the Conference: The Trans-At-
lantic Relationship – Aviation Policy: Clea-
ring the way to a More Open Market
(2003), to be found at: www.asil.org/pdfs/
Avaiation_policy.pdf - last visited on 12
September 2005.
18 The Agreement can be found on:
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/us-ec-pc.htm - as last
visited on 12 September 2005.
19 See, for instance, the case of the Com-
mission versus the Federal Republic of
Germany, in the matter of Germany’s
Open Skies agreement with the US, Case
C-476/98, par. 144-162, available at
http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?
smartapi!celexplus!prod!CELEXnumdoc&l
g=en&numdoc=61998J0476.
Satellite navigation has already per-
meated our lives and in particular the
potential applications of the Galileo
Program and its predecessor, the
EGNOS Program, are evidenced by
the Italian Space Agency’s application
programs which aim to promote tech-
nological innovation of applications
and services and prepare the way for
use of the Galileo system. The pro-
grams which are discussed in this arti-
cle include: Three Macro projects in
the framework of Transport safety for
Transport of Dangerous Goods, Mari-
time and Aeronautical Transport;
Three “short term Development” Pro-
jects aimed at demonstrating the ef-
fectiveness of navigation systems
when combined with other technolo-
gies for applications such as road
transport, territorial and citizen safety
and mobility of the disabled; a “Soft-
ware radio” terminal Development
project; and a geographic Test Bed. 
plied to the operation of international
air services – including the operation
of air services but Community air car-
riers from and to a point in the Com-
munity – as a matter of principle:
Freedom of establishment removes re-
stricting practices and clauses in bila-
teral agreements based on nationality
conditions.
The ECJ decision determined the
agenda of the Commission in the
years to follow.20
The Commission fought hard to ex-
ploit the effects of the Freedom of
establishment by insisting that it
should be mandated not only to re-
place nationality conditions by “Com-
munity law-based” conditions in so-
called horizontal mandates, but also
to conclude overall air services agree-
ments, including traffic rights, via so-
called vertical agreements. 
To apply the Freedom of establish-
ment to the air transport sector is as
tempting for further liberalisation as
complicated for the sector. There are
no uniform definitions of what and
“establishment” means, or under
which circumstances an airline can be
held to have a ‘principal place of busi-
ness’. 
A related and even more essential
question is which state or authority is
going to exercise regulatory control of
safety, security and environmental
standards with respect to an airline
established in that state or in a certain
jurisdiction. 
When these – and other – questions
have been resolved, it seems to me
that the freedom of establishment
can give an extra impetus to the libe-
ralisation of air services. Among the
other questions are labour concerns
which also play a role in other ap-
proaches towards liberalisation, as
this may imply a shake out and a res-
haping of the industry. 
In addition, it has to be decided which
traffic rights may be operated from an
establishment in another jurisdiction.
Such schemes seem to be too far
away to discuss within the scope of
this brief essay.
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
As briefly outlined above there are va-
rious roads to achieve liberalisation in
the air transport sector. One way is
more realistic than the other.
The “GATS approach” would mean a
too radical reform of the current regi-
me. The aviation world does not seem
ready for it.
The most tried tool is Open Skies, but
the name of the concept deceives. An
Open Skies policy, at least as formula-
ted by the US government, has its li-
mits. The next step must be an Open
Skies plurilateral agreement, also cal-
led an Open Aviation Area, which
may shape Transatlantic traffic. Other
states or areas may follow suit.
Within such Open Aviation Areas,
which is marked by the absence of a
priori restrictions upon the operation
of air services operated within the
area, competition must be regulated.
Absent an overall competition law re-
gime, the participating states must de-
cide on jurisdiction in the context of
competition. The ‘effects’ doctrine,21
in combination with the principle of
‘positive comity’ could provide solu-
tions for the time being – that is, until
consensus is reached on a converged
or harmonised competition regime.
Finally, true liberalisation must be ac-
companied by the implementation of
the Freedom of establishment. Howe-
ver, since the air transport sector is
not familiar with the regulatory and
practical effects of this principle, its in-
troduction should be made subject to
further examination and scrutiny.
Continua ...
20 See, EC Commission, Communication
from the Commission, Developing the
agenda for the Community’s external avia-
tion policy, Brussels, 11 March 2005,
COM(2005) 79 final.
21 As Article 81 of the EC Treaty does not
require that the “undertakings” have an
“EC nationality” or that they have an esta-
blishment with the Community area: the
principal condition for application of the
said article is that trade between Member
States is affected, irrespective of nationa-
lity criteria, as confirmed by the ECJ in the
so called ‘Wood Pulp’ cases: Cases 89/85,
114/85, 116-117/85, 125-129/85, A. Ahl-
ström Osakeyhtiö v. Commission (Wood
Pulp), Decision of 27 September 1988.
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